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Abstract 
This paper is part of an attempt to introduce intentionality of the actor to planning 
decisions. As a first step in this process the usual representations for actions used by plan- 
ning systems must be reevaluated. This paper argues for the elimination of preconditions 
and qualification conditions from action representation in favor of explicit representation 
of intention, situated reasoning about the results of the action and reactive failure mecha- 
nisms. The paper then describes a planning system that has explicit representation and use 
of intentions and uses act ion represent at ions that do not have preconditions. 
1 Planning and intention 
The manner in which an agent chooses t o  accomplish a given task is often 
determined not only by the actual action or goal, but also by the agent's 
other intentions. For example, breaking the door off its hinges is a way of 
satisfying the goal of having a door open, however, this is not the first way 
one would think of to achieve that goal. 
We can see the role intentions play in our planning deliberations in two 
ways. First, they can be seen as the ends of our deliberations that is to  
say, those things that we want to  achieve in the future. Second, they can 
play a constraining role in the manner in which we chose to satisfy other 
intentions. Bratman[3] gives a description of these two different facets of 
intentions and their role in planning. 
The goal of this work is to  try to provide a principled treatment of in- 
tentions within planning. Toward this end we must reevaluate the role of 
preconditions in action representations. Preconditions have often implicitly 
encoded intentions the agent must hold for an action to  achieve its expected 
effects. For example, in STRIPS[G] the action PICKUP(a) had as a pre- 
condition that the block "a" must be clear. This is not logically required 
for moving blocks; it is not even physically required. This condition must 
be true only if the agent has intentions not to move other blocks or if the 
objects on "a" make the action physically impossible for the agent in that 
world state or if the objects on "a" would cause a result that is undesired 
in the situation. Notice that all of these possibilities are dependent on the 
situation in which the action is being taken. 
In short, preconditions have encoded situation dependent information 
(often specifically intentional information) in a universal manner. If we are 
to  have a principled treatment of intentions we must extract these intentions 
and represent them explicitly. Explicit encoding of intentions and the use 
of situated reasoning will allow us to  eliminate preconditions from action 
representation and will provide us with explicit intentions t o  use in making 
planning decisions. Section two of this paper will give arguments against 
various kinds of preconditions; section three will describe a system that plans 
without the use of preconditions. Section four will suggest future directions 
for this research. 
2 Eliminating Preconditions 
In the introduction of this paper I suggested that it is possible to com- 
pletely eliminate preconditions in action representation. First, we must ask 
ourselves why we want to do this. In the case of this work, the reason is 
clear. As we saw early in this paper some of the standard preconditions 
for lifting blocks in the blocks world can be seen as encoding negative in- 
tentions about moving other blocks. Since our goal is a clear and uniform 
treatment of intentionality in planning, it is important for us to be explicit 
in our representation and use of intentions. 
The second question is whether it is possible to  eliminate all precondi- 
tions. They have a long and successful history in the planning literature, 
and there are a number of problems that are conveniently solved by them. 
If we are to eliminate preconditions we must find other solutions to  these 
problems. The next sections will discuss various definitions of preconditions, 
discuss arguments against them, and sketch other solutions to the problems 
they solve. 
2.1 Preconditions vs. Qualifications 
At this point, we need to set out some definitions. Preconditions are usually 
defined as those conditions which must be true before an action is taken. 
This definition is unclear at best, and so a further distinction is often made, 
namely the distinction between preconditions and applicability conditions or 
qualifications [ll]. 
Traditionally preconditions define when an action can be completed suc- 
cessfully while qualifiers describe the situations in which an action (if com- 
pleted successfully) is relevant to a goal. The basic difference between pre- 
conditions and qualifiers is in how they are treated by the planner. If a 
precondition for an action is false, an agent might attempt to make it true 
in order to  carry out the action. While if a qualifier for an action is false, 
the action itself should be considered inappropriate or irrelevant. The next 
two sections will examine ways in which preconditions and qualifiers define 
the conditions required for the success or relevance of actions and how they 
might be better replaced by other mechanisms. 
2.2 Preconditions 
A precondition might guarantee the success of an action in a number of ways. 
First, we might say that a condition P is a precondition of an action a in that 
it must be true before a is taken in order for a to have its intended effects. 
For now let us leave aside the question of intentionality. Instead, we must 
ask how do we determine the effects of the action? Any specific instance of 
an action will have a number of effects; some of these effects happen every 
time the action is performed while others are only the serendipitous result 
of the situation in which the particular instance happened. 
For example, our moving blocks example. Moving a block that is under 
another block can have a number of effects. The block on top may fall 
and break or it may remain balanced and move with the lower block. The 
question is, when defining the action's effects exactly which of these effects 
should we consider? Obviously, we do not want to talk about all of the 
possible results of an action; we would like t o  be able to say, preconditions 
define those conditions required for the action to result in its "usual" effects. 
This however dooms us to the very slippery slope of defining what is "usual." 
At this point let us reintroduce the question of "intended" effects. Even 
if we are able to define the usual results of an action, we must question which 
of these effects are intended by the agent. Given the history of this debate 
[3] [5] [7] it is far from clear that we can answer this question. It is certain 
that, we cannot answer this question without appeal to the intentions of 
the agent, and this information can only be determined at the time of an 
action's execution. In our previous example, we can easily imagine instances 
in which an agent intends each of the possible results. Therefore, in order to  
complete a definition of this type, we would need to examine the intentions 
of the agent each time the action is performed. Finally we must ask, do the 
preconditions reflect only those conditions that must be true for the action 
to  result in only the intended effects? Certainly, the variability in intentions 
even within one agent makes this type of definition impossible. 
Second, we could say state P is a precondition of action a if it is necessary 
that P hold before performing a in order to guarantee that a not have any 
unintended effects. This definition has many of the same flaws as the last 
one we considered. It again calls for us to define all of the effects of the 
action or at least some fixed subset which are usual. 
After determining the usual effects, we must decide which are unintended 
by the agent. As before, the intentions of the agent can only be determined 
at the time of the execution of the action, however, the problem of defining 
the unintended effects of an action goes a step further than that of the 
intended effects. Unintended effects fall into two distinct categories, known 
versus unknown. That is to say, if an effect is not defined as a usual result 
of the action does that make it unintended or simply unknown? 
An explicit representation of intentions will solve this problem. If we 
have explicit representations of positive and negative intentions, the problem 
of unintended versus unknown effects is trivially solved. Those negative 
intentions the agent holds are unintended. This gives us a clear distinction 
between unintended and unknown effects. 
Finally, we might define a state P as a precondition of action a in that 
P must be true before a is undertaken in order that a can be completed 
successfully. As an example, a precondition of lifting a block is that the 
block not be too heavy to lift. That is to say, the action lift cannot be 
successfully completed if the block is too heavy. It is often the case with 
these preconditions that the agent cannot know if the precondition holds 
unless he or she attempts the action, witness the weight of the block or 
the presence of ink in a pen for writing. How else could we know if the 
preconditions hold if we haven't taken the action? 
This problem of foreknowledge has lead traditional planning theorists to 
suggest that while we are aware of these sorts of conditions we do not worry 
about them unless the action fails, for example, the famous "potato in the 
tail pipe" of McCarthy. These conditions are not really preconditions at  all. 
They are more accurately explanations for the action's failure. Therefore, 
this information should be used to explain the action's failure after the fact. 
2.3 Qualifiers 
As we mentioned before, qualifiers are used to determine the relevance of an 
action. I argue, an action's relevance is determined by the world state and 
the intentions of the agent rather than any other conditions. That is to say 
an action a is relevant to achieving a state, S, just in the case cr can achieve 
S in the current world state and S is not already true in the world. Other 
systems have defined an action cr to be relevant only if its qualifiers are all 
true. 
As with preconditions, there are a number of kinds of qualifiers, and as 
before, I will take each in turn and discuss why it can be eliminated. First, 
a state Q might be a qualification condition of an action a if it is logically 
required for the performance of a. For example, a logical qualification condi- 
tion of the action "kill the King of France" is that there be a King of France. 
However, notice that this action can be determined to be irrelevant by our 
definition. Since there is no King of France it is impossible for any action 
to  achieve a state where he is dead. Therefore by our definition there is no 
relevant action. Therefore, there is certainly no reason to include qualifiers 
of this kind. 
Second, a state Q might be a qualification condition of an action a if Q 
is a physical qualification on the action. This sort of physical qualification 
could take on two forms. First, a physical qualifier might be a relevance 
condition. For example, a qualification condition on unplugging an object 
is that the object be plugged in to begin with. This means, unplugging is 
irrelevant if the object is not plugged in. Again this sort of painfully obvious 
condition is rendered unnecessary by our definition of relevant actions. If 
the object is plugged in and we want to change that state then any action 
that achieves it will be relevant. Otherwise we need not consider actions. 
However, a second kind of physical qualifier exists. These are similar 
to the preconditions for successfully completing an action. For example, it 
must be the case that an object is not irrevocably fixed to the ground if one 
is to lift it. These sorts of conditions have all of the same properties as their 
precondition counterparts, and so we will treat them in a similar manner. 
Since knowledge of the condition of the qualifiers usually requires performing 
the action, we can again eliminate these conditions in favor of dealing with 
the failure of the action. It is interesting to note that qualification conditions 
of this variety may in fact be preconditions where the actions necessary to 
achieve them are deemed to be too expensive by the agent. 
There is a final kind of qualification condition, arbitrary rules. An ex- 
ample from everyday life is traffic regulations. It is not logically required 
that a tr&c light be green before moving through an intersection, and we 
can all attest to  the fact that it is not physically required that the light be 
green. However, we have a rule that we are not supposed to undertake an 
intersection crossing action while the traffic light over the intersection is red. 
This is certainly the weakest type of qualification condition. As we 
know, these conditions are regularly ignored by human agents when they 
believe the reasons for the rule are inoperative. As with most preconditions, 
these qualification conditions are situation dependent rather than universal 
in nature, and therefore should be eliminated in favor of situated reasoning 
using the intentions of the agent. 
3 ItPlanS 
The Intentional Planning System (ItPlanS) is a first step toward a planner 
that gives intentions the role in planning they deserve. It is a planning 
system that currently operates in the blocks world. ItPlanS is similar to 
hierarchical planners in that it recursively expands intentions, developing 
lower level intentions until an intention is found that can be immediately 
satisfied by a single action. This action is taken and the process is repeated. 
The only structure maintained across each iteration is a list of the top level 
intentions. This means that the decompositions for a given intention can 
vary from iteration to  iteration allowing ItPlanS to adapt its plan to a 
changing world environment. Since ItPlanS is only finding the next action 
based on the world state, the system's knowledge, and its intentions, it 
might be more accurately viewed as an action theory rather than a planning 
system. The following subsections give a detailed account of the system's 
construction and operation. 
3.1 Intentions in ItPlanS 
In ItPlanS positive intentions are represented as predicates like ON(a,b) or 
BROKEN(a) from the blocks world. These intentions are kept in an ordered 
intention list. Since ItPlanS only reasons about a single agent and it will 
take steps to achieve any intention it adopts, this representation is equivalent 
to  INTEND(ACHIEVE(ON(a,b))). 
It is also possible to have negative intentions. That is to say, it is possible 
to have an intention not to cause certain states to come about. For example, 
in the blocks world I might not want to break blocks. I can state this as a 
negative intention; I don't want to cause a state where BROKEN(X) holds 
for any X. To represent this ItPlanS has a second intention list containing 
only negative intentions. It is important to notice that negative intentions 
are described as predicates just as positive intentions are. Negative inten- 
tions can be interpreted as INTEND(NOT(ACHIEVE(predicate))). There 
is however, a question about this interpretation; is this equivalent to IN- 
TEND(NOT(HOLD(predicate)))? Notice that if the system is the only 
agent of change in the world, these two options are the same. It is only 
in the case where there are other agents in the world that these two diverge 
in meaning. 
The difference is in the licensing of preventive action. 
INTEND(NOT(ACHIEVE(predicate))) would normally only prevent the 
agent from acting to cause the predicate to become true. The question 
is, will it license preventive action? Should the system take active measures 
t o  prevent the occurrence of some predicate by the action of some other 
agent? In ItPlanS, I have made the assumption that regardless of the ex- 
istence of other agents in the world, the system will not take measures to  
prevent the other agents from acting in a manner that conflicts with its 
negative intentions. In short, ItPlanS remains agnostic about the existence 
of other agents, but will not take action to  prevent possible interference. 
Given this representation, one could argue that existing planning sys- 
tems are already dealing with intentions; this is only partially true. Usually 
systenls only deal with positive intentions; they do not represent the negative 
intentions of the agent explicitly, and therefore lack the power of ItPlanS. 
3.2 Action representation 
Since action representations in ItPlanS have no preconditions, it is impossi- 
ble for ItPlanS to use traditional backchaining on preconditions to produce 
plans. Therefore, ItPlanS is designed after the decomposition methods of 
hierarchical planners, and so makes a distinction between two different types 
of actions in its ontology, primitive and complex. Primitive actions are ac- 
tions in the traditional sense. They have a physical realization; that is, they 
perform some operation on the world. Complex actions, on the other hand, 
exist in order to perform the deconlposition of the system's intentions into 
subintentions in the same way that actions in hierarchical planners decom- 
pose goals into subgoals. It is also possible to understand the distinction 
between complex actions and primitive actions as the distinction between 
actions the system must "reason" about in order to perform versus those 
actions the system can perform "without thinking." 
3.2.1 Primitive Actions 
As noted, in ItPlanS primitive actions are the basic actions the system is 
capable of performing on the world. In the case of the blocks world there are 
only three of these: GRASP, LETGO, and GOTO. The selection of these 
actions and this number is arbitrary. The actions GRASP and LETGO have 
the obvious effects on the end effector and they have no arguments. The 
GOT0 action, on the other hand, moves the robot arm about the blocks 
world, and does take an argument. This argument specifies the desired 
location of the end effector at  the end of the movement. For example, the 
action GOTO(FRONT(a)) moves the end effector to the area in front of the 
block labeled "a" ' . 
GOT0 also has the effect of setting a focus for the special function 
NEAR, a relative distance measure. Executing a GOTO(NEAR) brings the 
effector close to the object in focus. Notice there is no argument to NEAR. 
The argument is obtained from the last GOT0 action. This means the 
series of actions GOTO(FRONT(b)), GOTO(NEAR) would at least have 
as its consequences AT(FRONT(b)) and NEAR(b). 
Each primitive action is defined by two sets of data. The first is a 
set of likely outcomes of performing the action; we will call these possible 
results. Possible result lists are designed to provide a concise, declarative 
statement about what the system believes might result from a given action. 
For example, a possible result of a GRASP action is INHAND(X) where X 
is a block. It  is important to notice that, the possible results of an action 
may not occur every time the actions does. For example, INHAND(X) is 
true after a GRASP action if and only if AT(FRONT(X)) and NEAR(X) 
were true in the world before the action was performed. 
The system also has a set of result rules which describe the effects the 
system believes the action will have in given situations. Result rules are 
designed to  provide the information needed to simulate the effects of prim- 
itive actions. These rules can be looked at as conditional add and delete 
lists for the action. Each result rule has three parts. First, the condition, is 
a list of predicates, the conjunction of which must be true in order for the 
rule t o  be applicable in simulating the action. Second, is a list of predicates 
that should be added to the world model by the action and finally is a list 
of predicates that should be deleted from the world model as a result of 
the action. For example, if we take our previous example the system would 
have a rule that stated that if AT(FRONT(X)) and NEAR(X) are true and 
a GRASP is executed then INHAND(X) will result. The system should also 
have a rule which states if INHAND(a) is true then if GOTO(FRONT(b)) 
is performed then block "a" is no longer where it was. 
Since result rules define what the system believes about how actions work 
in the world, they may be in error. It is not required that they be a correct 
axiomatization of the laws of physics or that they be limited to those results 
listed in an action's possible result list. Of course, for any action the add 
lists of the result rules should be a superset of the possible results, but even 
'See the section on Specifying locations for a description of the special function 
FRONT. 
this is not required. The distinction between the possible results and the 
result rules is maintained for exactly this possibility. If the possible results 
list of an action names a result not listed in one of the result rules, this 
tells us that the system believes some predicate often follows from an action 
without knowing the exact conditions under which it will follow. 
The objective of primitive actions is to attempt to  define a small set of 
actions from which larger behaviors can be built. The choice of actions as 
primitive is arbitrary and can certainly be changed. Assumably as an agent 
becomes more expert a t  a specific type of problem they will develop more 
primitive actions to  simplify the problem. Note, primitive actions are the 
only actions that actually effect the state of the world; all complex actions 
are realized as a series of primitive actions. 
3.2.2 Complex Actions 
Complex actions are not really actions at all. While they share many things 
with the primitive actions, complex actions can best be viewed as functions 
from a single intention to an ordered set of intentions. In effect, they map 
from an intention to  a set of subintentions that need to  be achieved in order 
for the original intention to be achieved. 
For example, the representation for the action STACK(X,Y) maps the in- 
tention of ON(X,Y) to the list of intentions [INHAND(X), HANDOVER(Y), 
HANDEMPTY] which, when achieved in order, will result in a STACK op- 
eration. Notice, the action's definition does not specify how to achieve any 
of these subintentions; any way to achieve them will be equally valid. Com- 
plex actions also have a possible results list, and again the possible result 
lists are not required to be accurate. As with primitive actions, arguments 
to  complex actions denote locations in the universe. 
As was mentioned above, in ItPlanS, the results of a complex action are 
seen as nothing more than the sum of the results of the primitive actions 
chosen to  satisfy its subintentions. Since the actions taken can vary from 
occurrence to occurrence, there is no way to  have complete beliefs about the 
results of a complex action. So while complex actions have possible results, 
they do not have result rules. 
At this point, I will once more state the obvious. None of the actions 
has any form of preconditions. Any action can be undertaken at any time 
and at any condition of the world. Of course, it will often be the case that 
the action will not have the expected outcome if taken randomly, however, 
this does not preclude performing the action. 
3.3 Specifying Locations 
In order to  provide a uniform treatment of block stacking to arbitrary 
heights, it was necessary to develop a method for representing space. To 
this end, I have defined a number of functions from objects in the world to 
areas of space around them. This treatment is not intended t o  be complete 
or rigorous, nor is it to  be a substantive part of the work to  follow. It is to 
be seen as a tool to  solve some of the problems of designating locations in 
the world and may undergo serious revision. 
The functions I defined are suggested by the English prepositions LEFT, 
RIGHT, FRONT, BACK, OVER, UNDER; these functions map from the 
argument/object to  the spatial area described. For example, the action 
GOTO(LEFT(b)) would move the end effector to some arbitrary location 
t o  the left of block "b." As a result the world now contains the statement 
AT(LEFT(b)) reflecting the changed position of the effector. 
3.4 The Algorithm 
ItPlanS' algorithm works in the following manner. The agent starts each 
iteration with two lists, one of positive intentions and the other of negative 
intentions. The agent linearly searches the list of its positive intentions to  
find the first intention not satisfied in the current world state. If there is no 
primitive action that has this intention in its possible results list the system 
finds a complex action that does. Using the complex action's mapping func- 
tion the algorithm creates a new list of positive subintentions. This list is 
searched for its first unsatisfied intention and the process is repeated until 
an intention is found that can be satisfied by use of a single primitive action. 
For example, if we look at  figure 1, we see that initially in the blocks 
world we have three intentions. The first of these, ON(a,b) is already true 
in the world. Therefore, the next intention the system needs to  satisfy 
is ON(c,d) since it is not true in the world already. ItPlanS checks its 
knowledge base and determines that a STACK action has as a possible re- 
sult ON(c,d). Since STACK is a complex action, ItPlanS next considers 
the list of subintentions a STACK action results in namely: INHAND(c), 
HANDOVER(d), HANDEMPTY. ItPlanS then checks to see if any of these 
intentions are already satisfied in the world, and discovers that, in fact, IN- 
HAND(c) is. Therefore the next intention to be satisfied is HANDOVER(d). 
Notice, the process continues until the intention NEAR(d) is reached. At 
this point a primitive action can be used to satisfy the intention namely 
GOTO(NEAR). 
Notice, the system, in looking for the first unsatisfied intention at each 
level of decomposition, is constantly reacting to the actual state of the world 
so that if an accident occurred and the last action performed did not have 
the consequences the agent expected, the agent can correct it immediately. 
The agent can also attend to any other intention that has suddenly been 
invalidated. 
Having found an intention that can be satisfied by a single primitive 
action, ItPlanS selects one primitive action to achieve this intention.' The 
system creates a minimal model of the world relevant to  the action. Then 
ItPlanS simulates the performance of the action on the world by selecting 
the action's most specific result rule whose condition is true in the world, 
and adding and deleting propositions from its model as appropriate to derive 
the model of the world after the action is taken. If the resulting world model 
does not contain any of the negative intentions of the agent the action is 
carried out. This completes the selection of one action by the system. The 
system then repeats this process for the next action, discarding all but the 
top level of the intentional structure. 
It may be argued that the system never commits to a single plan. This 
could lead to incoherent action in which the system follows one possible plan 
for a step and then undoes that action. In ItPlanS, the coherence of action 
relies on the meta-stability of the top level intentions of the system and the 
relative predictability of the world. I assume that intentions are inherently 
persistent, and this 1.ongevity will prevent trashing of the type described. 
In fact, the absence of commitment is a positive side effect for the system. 
It  is this lack of commitment to a single plan that allows the system to utilize 
positive changes in the environment when they happen without a need to 
alter the adopted plan in any significant manner. 
3.5 Negative Intention Conflict 
There are a number of outstanding issues left out of this algorithm. Foremost 
is what does the system do if all of the explored primitive actions violate one 
of the negative intentions of the system? ItPlanS has a recovery mechanism 
for these situations which relies heavily on the accuracy of the action's result 
rules. What has happened in these cases is all of the examined actions have 
been determined to cause problems. What the system needs to do is to 
21t is possible for more than one primitive action to satisfy the selected intention. 
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decide on the action it would "like" to take and then remove the causes of 
the problematic result of the action. 
For example, suppose block "b" is stacked on block "a" and further 
suppose that I am grasping block "a" but have not yet moved it. Let us also 
assume that I have an intention to move block "a" to a new position, and I 
don't intend to break anything. The only action I have available to me that 
will reposition block "a" is the action GOTO. Finally, let us suppose that I 
know that if I perform a GOT0 action, block "b" will fall off and break. At 
this point I am stuck. The only action to  achieve my ends will violate my 
negative intentions. specifically moving block "a" will cause a state where 
block "b" is broken violating my negative intention about breaking things. 
Obviously, in this case, what I should do is determine the cause of this 
conflict, (in this case it is the presence of a block on top of what I want 
to  move) and eliminate this cause (unstack block "b" from block "a"). In 
effect, this is exactly the process ItPlanS follows. In the example, there is 
only one possible action that can achieve my intention. In general, however, 
there may be many, so the first step ItPlanS takes in this process is to decide 
on which possible primitive action it will attempt to remove impediments 
to. 
Having decided on an action ItPlanS looks up the result rule that is 
applied in the simulation to produce the conflict. Our goal in this process 
is to prevent this result rule from being applied to the model of the world. 
This result rule was chosen because all of the predicates in the conditional 
portion of the rule were true in the world. If one of the predicates in the 
condition of the result rule were false the rule would not be used to simulate 
the action and therefore the conflict would not arise. 
Let us return to our example to see how this works. The result rule 
that would be applied for this use of GOT0 would be something of the 
form [[INHAND(X), ON(Y,X)], [ON(Y ,table), BROKEN(Y)], [ON(Y,X), 
ON(X,Z)]]. Where the first element is the condition, the second is the add 
list, the third is the delete list, 'LX,Y,Z" are all variables, and "table" is a 
constant. In order for this rule to be applied, it must be the case in the world 
that INHAND(X) and ON(Y,X) are both true. In our specific example, we 
know that INHAND(a) and ON(b,a) so the rule is applicable. In order to 
keep this rule from being applicable to the simulation we need to  violate one 
of the elements of the conditional. That is, we need it to be that case that 
either INHAND(X) or ON(Y,X) is not true in the world. 
At this point ItPlanS chooses one of these conditions to invalidate, inverts 
the condition and achieves this inverted proposition as a positive intention. 
This will remove one of the conditions from the world making the rule in- 
valid. Having done this, the original GOT0 action can now be carried out 
without the undesired consequence of BROKEN(b). Of course, this method 
requires the agent's knowledge base to contain information about how to 
invert actions. In our example, the agent must know that the way to  undo 
ON(b,a) is to  achieve ON(b,table). 
We must also produce a method for deciding on which condition to 
invalidate. It  would be unfortunate if we chose to invert one of the intentions 
we just achieved when there was another possibility. As a partial solution to 
this problem, the system maintains a list of those intentions that are "above 
and to the left" of the current. That is to say, the system keeps a list of all 
the intentions it has tested in the decomposition process which have been 
determined to be satisfied. In figure 1. these intentions are underscored. 
It  will obviously be preferable to invalidate an intention that is not on this 
list, since they are necessary for the achievement of the system's intentions 
and have been achieved already. Therefore, ItPlanS makes every effort to 
protect these intentions. 
If it is impossible to  find an intention that is not on the list of "protected" 
intentions then one from that list must be selected and inverted. This is the 
worst possible case as this intention must be marked as special to prevent 
the system from trashing and undoing the work already done. This method 
roughly corresponds to goal advancement in traditional planning systems. 
4 Results and Future work 
I have implemented the ItPlanS system as it is described above. The system 
performs exactly as we wanted it to do. Unless the system is given as a 
negative intention BROKEN(X) it will ignore the traditional preconditions 
of clearing off blocks before picking them up. However, when given the 
appropriate negative intention the system finds it must clear off the blocks 
before lifting them, showing that the intentions of the agent and the world 
state can be used to eliminate preconditions for actions. While the system as 
it is described does succeed in solving the most of the traditional problenls 
in planning, there are obviously a number of issues that need further study. 
4.1 Choices and ItPlanS 
One of the most important issues that I want to look at in this work it 
the role that intentions play in the planning process. If we take Bratman 
[3] seriously then intentions play two roles. One of these is constraining 
possible plans. Bratman talks about making choices about how to get to 
Tanner library and the fact that his intentions to leave a car for his wife 
constrain this decision. This is exactly the type of concern I want to look 
at, the role that other intentions play in determining the ways of satisfying 
our present intentions. 
In ItPlanS, there are actually three different places that this kind of 
information will be needed in order to  make choices about what actions to 
take. The first and most obvious is the action decomposition process. There 
is nothing in this formalism that suggests that for a given intention there is 
only one action which satisfies it. This leaves us with two major questions. 
First, if an intention needs to be broken down into subintentions and there 
is more than one action to accomplish this task which one should It Plans 
chose? Obviously, we want ItPlanS to consider its list of future intentions, 
and attempt to determine if some of these actions are incompatible with 
some or all of the system's possible actions. I have had some thoughts on 
this subject but as I have said this is largely an area for future work. Second, 
is the question of multiple primitive actions fulfilling an intention. Are some 
primitive actions better than others for some intentions? And if so how 
should ItPlanS decide this issue? 
The second place intentions should impact the choices ItPlanS makes is 
in the choosing of actions when there is a negative intention conflict. As 
noted, as the first step in that process, ItPlanS must chose one course of 
action to  pursue. This choice is very similar to the previous case. However, 
in this case, there is more information to be considered, for example, the 
ease with which one can invert one of the result rule's conditions, and the 
other results of inverting one of the condition. 
Finally, the choice of which condition to invert in a result rule in the event 
of a negative intention conflict must involve the system's other intentions. 
As stated earlier, ItPlanS already considers those intentions that have been 
satisfied when making this choice. Of course, ItPlanS should also consider 
its future intentions when making this decision. It may be the case that 
one of the possible conditions is significantly easier to change or will involve 
less change in the world. Or it might be the case that inverting one of the 
conditions will interfere with the achievement of one of the system's later 
intentions. Obviously this would not be a good choice. 
In the end, the intentions of the system play a role in just about all of its 
decisions. Some of these roles have been well specified in the existing work. 
However, at  least in these three cases, there is more work to be done. 
4.2 Limiting Model Size and Complexity 
Another area for future work is in the construction of the models of the world 
ItPlanS uses to simulate the results of its actions. I suggested that ItPlanS 
makes a "minimal" model of the world in which to simulate the action. I 
argue the size and content of the model depend on the action being taken 
and the problem space. 
One of the chief problems in planning has been the maintenance of large 
models of the world. Therefore, ItPlanS limits the models created to sim- 
ulating a single action and should limit the size and complexity of these 
models to information believed to be relevant to the action. For example, 
when performing a GOT0 action in the blocks world the color of the block 
in unimportant and should not be included in the simulation. On the other 
hand, the ON relation is very important when considering a GOT0 action. 
Therefore, in order to generate the model for a specific action, ItPlanS 
should start with the set of objects directly involved with the action and 
construct the transitive closure of the relevant predicates over this initial 
set. Let us return to our example, if we assume that ON is the only relevant 
predicate, the the initial set of objects in our model is just the block "a" 
since the action we are going to carry out is a GOT0 and INHAND(a) is 
true. Taking the transitive closure of the ON relation will get us all of the 
relations that hold between anything "a" is on and anything on "a." 
While I believe this to be a satisfactory solution to this problem, I have 
not yet implemented it in the ItPlanS system. Therefore, I have no empirical 
validation for the sufficiency for this procedure yet. Of course, this solution 
method implies that ItPlanS must have declarative knowledge of those rela- 
tions relevant to the results of actions, however, this does not strike me as 
unrealistic in any way. 
4.3 Reasoning in the World Model 
There is a second problem with the modeling of action's effects in ItPlanS. 
The simple add and delete lists in result rules are not powerful enough to 
express all of the beliefs we would like the agent to hold as a result of an 
action. For example, we want to be able to express the fact that all of the 
blocks on top of a block that is moved will fall, not just the one stacked 
immediately on top of it. This type of inference calls for a limited reasoner 
to be placed in the action simulator. The bounds and limits for this type of 
reasoning will most likely involve some kind of naive physics. Here again, I 
have not given the problem much thought, but it is clear that something of 
this type is required. The need for this kind of limited reasoning will have 
to be explored even if only to find a sufficient solution in order to look at 
the more central issues of this work. 
4.4 Belief Inconsistency and Inaccuracy 
Finally there is a large area to be explored in terms of the requirements 
for consistency and accuracy in the agents beliefs. In ItPlanS the system's 
beliefs about the outcomes of actions are not required to be correct; the 
possible results lists may be in error as may the result rules. However, the 
system as it stands now assumes that the agent's beliefs ARE, in fact, correct 
and that all actions are completed successfully. 
There are a number of issues that must be looked at in this light. Some 
of these I have alluded to before. Since the possible results of an action are 
not required to be a subset of the addlists of the result rules it is possible 
for the agent to know that an action causes a result but not know why. 
Also the issues of the monitoring to check for the completion of actions as 
well as issues of failure recovery. For example, when should ItPlanS decide 
that the action it has just carried out not been successful? How should it 
react to this failure? 
These are just some of the obvious limitations associated with the incom- 
pleteness of the systems knowledge. While I again have not given substantial 
thought to these problems, they are significant and further work needs to 
be done to confront them. 
5 Conclusion 
The ItPlanS systenl, while it embodies many of the elements we have talked 
about, I feel, is nothing more than a platform for this work. Research into 
the role of intentions in action selection has been sadly lacking in the area 
of planning. The relevance and role played by intentions in action choices 
is the main trust of this work and while ItPlanS begins to address some of 
these issues there is a great deal of work left to be done. 
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